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DISPATCH NO. ECMA-5939

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TO : Chief SR (Attn: [])
FROM : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt ALY
SUBJECT: GENERAL— REDSOX/CACCOLA B
SPECIFIC— Transmittal of Final Report

DATE: 9 June 1953

Deadline:		Check one:
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1. Transmitted herewith is the final report covering CACCOLA B from its beginning on 17 May 1952 to 29 April 1953 when the last two CACCOLA B trainees were dispatched.

2. Attached as Appendix A is a list of courses taught during this period; Appendix B indicates S/W and/or cipher indicators, safety signals, and addresses assigned by CAPABLE 7 to each trainee.

Att: (1)

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~~REPORT~~

SUBJECT: REDSOX/Final Report, CACCOLA B

1. INTRODUCTION:

The following report is an overall review of the CACCOLA B training cycle which began 17 May 1952, with the assessment of the first trainee, and ended 29 April 1953 with the dispatch of CACCOLAS 22 and 27. It is hoped that the report will supply a guide to the evaluation of future W/T traffic, note certain improvements and some persistent weaknesses, and indicate what direction our future efforts might take.

In the CACCOLA A cycle there were 10 people in the school. This time there were 18: 3 CAPABLE 1 instructors, 8 trainees, 2 cooks, 1 houseman and 4 American case officers. Although the project was larger and its personnel different, in spirit and practice it continued to adhere to the principles of the basic CACCOLA protocol worked out with CAPABLE 7 (see MGMA-07725).

2. CAPABLE 1 INSTRUCTOR PERSONNEL:

(a) CAPABLE 14 as senior CAPABLE 1 representative and instructor was a marked improvement over CACCOLA 2. His lectures were lively and well-organized, and his ready assumption of responsibility, his practical judgment and "western" orientation made him an easy man for us to work with. However, two weaknesses should be noted. Neither the instructors under him nor the trainees received the attention and leadership due them from the head of the school, and in planning the training program and missions he failed to show the initiative we expected from a man of his calibre. Much of this can be attributed, perhaps, to the psychological aftereffects of CAPABLE 14's aborted marriage.

(b) CACCOLA 3, despite his occasional woolly-mindedness, was a valuable component of the school -- hard working, even-tempered and well-liked. His intellectual shortcomings and inability to maintain good discipline were more apparent in this cycle as the trainees were more numerous and more intelligent. However, feeling he was with them heart and soul, they forgave him much. This latter factor is very important in maintaining morale. In the preparation of legends, particularly military ones, and in survival techniques, CACCOLA 3 is extremely competent. His weaknesses are essentially the result of twelve years' absence from the Soviet Union and his former military career which spared him the necessity of fending for himself on the Soviet economy. Thus he cannot do a first rate job instructing clandestine operators how to live and move in the U.S.S.R. today. With assistance from a newer defector, however, and with stronger leadership to insist on stricter discipline, CACCOLA 3 will continue to pull his weight.

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(c) CACCOLA 8 as W/T instructor worked tirelessly throughout the cycle, this time with ☐ to direct and assist him. CACCOLA 8 is another poor disciplinarian, but the men responded well to his eager interest in them and their work.

(d) CAPABLE 42 is already a competent W/T instructor and with training could teach tradecraft subjects, possibly P/T and survival techniques. His future position has yet to be determined, but his qualifications recommend his addition to the staff in any role. He has also requested that he be considered as a leader of a "black base" team. If the security considerations could be satisfactorily resolved he would be ideal in this role.

(e) CACCOLA 9 and CACCOLA 14 fulfilled their culinary and CACCOLA 13 her secretarial tasks with distinction. Despite forebodings, they got along well together and contributed warmth to the school atmosphere.

(f) CACCOLA 25 was a secure and willing houseman who applied himself with such diligence to W/T during his spare time that before the end of the cycle he was receiving 14 groups a minute. It is now our opinion that his self-discipline, determination and dependability would warrant his inclusion in a black base team, possibly even as its radio operator, if it were not for the fact that this would constitute an unnecessary security risk.

3. TRAINEES: The trainees as a whole were intelligent, disciplined and responsive students, deeply dedicated to the liberation of Russia and possessed with a hard-headed, practical approach to their role in the fight to achieve this. We shall indeed be lucky if we can maintain this standard in the selection of future trainees. The following comments summarize briefly what has already been written of each of them.

(a) CACCOLA 20, despite his difficult and unstable life, was a person of stamina, resourcefulness and moral fiber. Making up for his lack of education, he satisfied his intellectual curiosity by hard study and independent reading. Although young and somewhat introverted, he showed promise of leadership ability. He mastered all the subjects taught in the course of the training cycle thoroughly and easily, and was particularly good at reporting and message writing. Despite his inner nervousness he withstood the inevitable fears and apprehensions attendant to the final month before dispatch with outer calm, maintaining complete control over himself to the very end. (The jumpmaster reported that he grew completely pale just before the jump and asked for some brandy, but that he jumped decisively.)

(b) CACCOLA 21 was the problem child of the school, a somewhat weak-willed person whose main problem was to keep from getting drunk. His contention, and our hope, is that fear and operational necessity will restrain him once inside. When sober, CACCOLA 21 is both diligent and clever; with a little luck he should be able to establish himself quite easily, and to get in touch with underworld elements who should be a good source of O/I and documents. Like CACCOLA 6, CACCOLA 21 was badly frightened by the thought of dispatch but pulled himself together in the final days to make a manly departure.

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(c) CACCOLA 22 showed great improvement in the last month of training and was checked out as an adequate W/T operator. Although his thinking is not extensive, and his mind not very flexible, he is a determined person of sound common sense and complete reliability. His behavior during the last month was particularly calm and confident, and the jumpmaster reported that he jumped like an express train, knocking CACCOLA 27 through the door when the latter hesitated.

(d) CACCOLA 24 is a mature, thoughtful and cautious person. Although very apprehensive toward the end, he felt it his duty as the oldest of the ~~oldest of the~~ group to put on a good front, and he was in large measure responsible for the cheerful atmosphere at the school during the last few weeks. In Athens, he was very successful in calming and encouraging the younger CACCOLA 26.

(e) CACCOLA 26 was a boy scout type to the end -- eager and quick to learn, idealistic, warm-hearted and energetic, but boyish, and lacking the necessary judgment to discipline his lively imagination. He held himself very well up to the day he and CACCOLA 24 left the school for Athens at which time he grew very frightened. During the holding period at Athens he managed to pull himself together, and certainly gave no cause for complaint. The tough road ahead should mature him quickly, and his operational potential, both as a reporter and spotter is very great.

(f) CACCOLA 27 was an unusual problem. Highly intelligent, and rigidly upright in all his ways, he was psychologically incapable of the type of devious behavior that should make the going so easy for CACCOLA 21. His complete lack of self-confidence was very marked toward the end, but he never showed the slightest signs of wanting to back out. If he manages to survive the initial few months, which will be very difficult for him, he can be counted on to apply himself intelligently and conscientiously to his mission.

(g) CACCOLA 28 arrived some 3 months after the beginning of the training cycle, but had passed most of the other trainees by the end of the cycle. Very intelligent, practical, observant, an excellent reporter and W/T operator, much can be expected of him. His behavior was exemplary to the end.

(h) CACCOLA 10 was the least intelligent of the group, but above average in daring and reliability. His mission is primarily a technical one which he is competent to fulfill. Very worried during the last month of training, apparently because of his wife and children, he was nevertheless eager to go. He is scheduled to exfiltrate in 12-18 months.

4. ASSESSMENT:

That the system of assessment used for the second cycle was an improvement over the first is indicated by the fact that all the trainees but CACCOLA 23 who was dropped, turned out much as anticipated.

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After the close of the first cycle ☐ and CACCOLA 3 moved to a small house on Lake Starnberg where the candidates one by one visited them for a four or five day period. With a short biography and a Cadre School report already on hand, we further debriefed them, tested their knowledge of the Soviet Union, conspiracy, and other subjects, gave them code aptitude and physical fitness tests and made each take two jumps from the parachute tower. After a medical examination, we turned them over to the psychologists who tested them for another day and a half. Finally, we gave them LCFLUTTER tests at a later date in Frankfurt.

✓ CACCOLA 3 was a great help in bridging the gap in the candidates' minds between CAPABLE 1 and an unknown American organization. Thanks to him and our own efforts to be tactful we were able both to get all the necessary information and establish friendly relations.

5. TRAINING:

With greater experience, more material, and better training facilities, our instruction this cycle was better organized and included more practical work. We are still, however, overreliant on classroom lectures. In teaching reporting we used the case history method, supplemented by written practical problems in which the trainees gleaned relevant facts from descriptions of situations in which presumably they would one day find themselves. This far more vivid system of presentation could be used on a wide scale, and it is our hope to prepare a series of histories -- imaginative when real ones are not available -- to use in Soviet Life and Conspiracy. To supplement these we must have more "maneuvers", and, ideally, a series of new training films specially aimed at problems of peacetime operations in the U.S.S.R.

A breakdown of subjects taught in the course of the training cycle, including the instructor and number of hours for each subject, is attached as Appendix A. Only general comments on main subjects are contained in the following paragraphs:

(a) W/T: CACCOLAS 20, 24, 26, 27 and 28 became operators with more than satisfactory ratings. CACCOLA 10 was only satisfactory, while CACCOLAS 21 and 22 were graded slightly less than satisfactory. Both, nonetheless, are better than CACCOLAS 5 and 6 with whom we are in regular contact.

Each man worked a large number of on the air contacts with the RHMN base. The men were upset by the inexperience of some of the base operators, but confidence was restored after the five-day visit of ☐ the excellent chief base operator who worked the men before dispatch on their new procedures. ☐

✓ The next cycle must see more practical work in field conditions and a new theory-maintenance course with a thorough examination of all the radio equipment available in the U.S.S.R. This can be prepared easily through study of the several Soviet radio magazines we receive regularly.

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(b) Physical Training: Once again the main emphasis was on endurance, and by the end of the cycle most of the men could run five miles or carry a 90-pound pack on a nine-mile hike without strain. Considerable time was also devoted to unarmed combat. The most popular form of physical training and recreation was volleyball played on a court the men made near the house. Even the deep snows of winter could not halt the furious competition between the Ukrainian and Great Russian teams.

(c) Para Training: Para-training was greatly improved this year by the inclusion of three live jumps, two in the fall and one with full equipment during the spring dress rehearsal. The course was well taught, first by ☐ and later by ☐

(d) Ideology: The main purpose of this subject was to sustain the trainees' motivation by keeping constantly before them the ideological goals to which they had committed themselves. This was admirably done by CAPABLE 14 whose lectures on Christianity, Russian History, and various political doctrines geared to the trainees' level, were extremely stimulating. During the weekly zvenos the CAPABLE 1 program was dutifully analyzed in discussions led by the trainees in turn. These were somewhat less successful, due in part to the dull style and rather vague content of the program writers, and in part to the lack of time the trainees had to prepare themselves. Talks by the American case officers on U.S. history and CAPABLE 14's weekly expose of current events always led to lively discussions. It should be added that the broadcasts of the European station of the VOA were listened to daily with great interest and approval.

As most emigre Russians, particularly members of an organization, are intensely interested in matters of ideology, and as the rest generally feel they should be, we feel time spent by a good instructor on this subject pays off.

(e) Soviet Life: This subject was taught by CACCOLA 3 who diligently organized all available material. Although the course was more to the point, too much time still was spent on the "big picture" and not enough on the details of how to live an illegal or semi-legal life in conditions of the U.S.S.R. To remedy this situation we need first, the knowledge and experience of a new and knowledgeable defector, preferably one who has spent time dodging Soviet law, and second, to coordinate closely this subject with conspiratorial ones.

As Soviet Life is less a subject than an atmosphere, we insisted on the constant use of Soviet terminology (10 pushups for every foreign word), decorated the class with Soviet posters, played Soviet records, read Soviet newspapers, and listened regularly to Radio Moscow.

(f) Conspiracy: CAPABLE 14 gave fine lectures on basic conspiratorial techniques supplemented by examples drawn from the history of espionage and various underground movements. Field problems in observation, surveillance, clandestine contacts and dead-drops were carried out in and around Munich.

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Still lacking was practice in some of the main problems the trainees will face on their missions: obtaining new documents, applying for jobs, and extracting all types of information from unwitting informants. In other projects practical work in these subjects has been given in simulated situations with fair results. Our men objected to such skits on the grounds they were unrealistic, but with better demonstrations and preparation we hope for success next time. Also planned are some problems for the Cadre School or for a special course conducted by CAPABLE 20 for men who have completed the Cadre School and are waiting for a new CACCOLA cycle to begin. Under the plan they would be sent to various cities of Germany to obtain false documents, or at least find out where such could be obtained, and to answer a series of questions on the layout and life of the city. Even though conditions in Germany obviously differ from those of the U.S.S.R., and German presents a language barrier for most trainees, practice of this type would still be valuable, particularly for men like CACCOLA 27.

Better results this year were obtained in falsification of documents and S/W in which all the men became competent. CACCOLA 10 was well-instructed in photography by ☐ ☐

(g) Reporting: Under the direction of ☐ ☐ the case histories mentioned earlier for this course were prepared by CALLIDO and dealt with the post landing situation, travel, employment, residence, documentation, W/T, spotting and social-political conditions. These, with their exercises, were useful material for briefing as well. From this modest start the course must be enlarged and incorporated into one big course with Soviet Life and Conspiracy.

(h) Soviet Airfields and Radar Installations: A new and excellent eight-hour course on this subject was given by ☐ ☐

(i) City and Field Maneuvers: The school began with two strenuous weeks in survival techniques in the woods around Grafenwohr where we were aided by the Ranger detachment. Throughout the cycle's course dead drop, contact and surveillance problems were conducted with office personnel participating. During the last month a dress rehearsal for the first few days in the Soviet Union was staged in Grafenwohr. The men in groups of two's jumped at midnight with full equipment, and after burying their chutes moved out in the direction of the city where they were to board a train. After lying low for a day they continued their night march. The following day they changed to city clothes and after prior reconnaissance, boarded the train with their radio sets in suitcases. Extra contacts and dead-drops were added in the problem.

All these exercises were successful and should only have been more numerous.

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In late February it was agreed with Air Corps representatives to dispatch the trainees in late April and early May. There were to be three flights: one to the Caucasus, one to the Ukraine, and one to Belorussia, with the first two staged out of Athens and the third from Wiesbaden. Final plans were drawn up in late March shortly after which [] [] flew to Athens to make the necessary pre-dispatch arrangements.

On Sunday, April 19, a farewell banquet attended by [] and CACCOLA 2 was held. CAPABLE 7, called away, had made his adieux earlier. On Monday morning the order of departure was announced and CACCOLAS 24 and 26 flew with [] [] on the reserve plane to the "intermediary base" where the mission plane had preceded them by 24 hours. It was hoped the flight would take place the same night, but unfavorable weather delayed it until the 23rd. From Monday until Thursday the men remained with [] [] in a safe house. Morale remained high and the men departed in good spirits.

✓ Due to the age and unreliability of even the best available maps, we have been unable to pick a drop zone but only a drop area several miles square, leaving the selection of a suitable field to the discretion of the pilot. This year we again used the stop watch method by which the pilot picks an orientation point near the drop area and from this initial point (IP), proceeds by azimuth at jumping speed and altitude. By drawing this azimuth on their maps and by punching their stop watches at the IP and again just before jumping, the men are able to orient themselves quickly on the ground.

The first flight had a serious setback when, immediately after crossing the IP, the plane ran into a rainstorm forcing the men to jump "blind" in what was estimated to be the middle of the drop area. Worse yet, CACCOLA 26, tired from standing too long with his heavy bundle, jumped a full three seconds after CACCOLA 24. Until we hear differently, we must assume the men made tree landings at best and probably some 180 yards apart.

The second group consisting of CACCOLAS 10, 20, 21 and 28 flew from Furstenfeldbruck on Thursday morning and, after two days in another safe house in Athens, were dispatched Saturday night. This time, although it was raining slightly over the area where CACCOLAS 10 and 28 jumped, two good drop zones were found. Had neither drop area been visible, the pilot had instructions this time to bring the men back. Standing less time in the door, both "number 2" men made good exits.

The third flight left from Wiesbaden the night of April 29. Contrary to the others, CACCOLAS 22 and 27 never knew from where they were dispatched. Leaving the school that afternoon, they were flown to Wiesbaden from Furstenfeldbruck in a blacked out plane which taxied up to a hangar where they immediately boarded the mission plane. Two hours later they took off. The

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third flight was probably the most successful one. Finding the drop area "socked in" from the South, the pilot attacked it from the North on a new azimuth which he gave the men and found a good clearing. Jumping first, CACCOLA 27 hesitated on the "go" signal, but CACCOLA 22, charging from behind, swept him out. With exits less than a second apart, the men must have landed only a few yards from each other.

The plane crew must be recommended not only for their obvious professional ability but also for the quiet friendly way with which they treated the men.

7. OPERATIONS:

(a) Missions: As in the previous cycle the missions and target areas for the trainees were agreed upon by ☐ and CAPABLE 7. Following Headquarters approval of the tentative operational plans, the missions were worked out in detail by the undersigned, working closely with both CAPABLE 14 and CACCOLA 3 and with the IB Section/CSOB.

Although several of the CACCOLAS received special tasks, their basic assignment in all cases was legalization in their target areas, the maintenance of W/T and S/W contact, and the collection and transmittal of operational and political intelligence. All received training in reporting on aircraft, airfields and radar installations and were briefed to report on them on an availability basis. In addition, all the CACCOLAS were told to report on any favorable opportunities for the mounting of "Aktivist" operations: specific causes of dissatisfaction of the population in any particular area, weaknesses of the security organs, etc.; the spotting of disaffected and operationally useful persons was a part of this latter task.

✓ The CACCOLAS were briefed to seize any opportunity -- travel, seasonal employment, buying new documents -- in the initial few months which would aid them in the difficult task of legalization, and told that they were not bound to proceed immediately to their target areas. The plans for the first few months of each operation must therefore be considered tentative -- the agent was to be guided by local circumstances and by common sense.

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The agents were requested to hold contacts prior to leaving the woods if conditions on the ground permitted but, with the exception of CACCOLA 27, were not to consider themselves obliged to do so if a quick get-away appeared to be advisable. All the CACCOLAS planned to cache their radio sets in the woods near the DZ, make a preliminary reconnaissance of their target areas, returning to pick up their sets only when they already had picked out a safe place to keep it. Thus, after the initial week (during which time several of them could conceivably come up) we do not expect to hear from any of them for a period of 2-6 weeks depending on circumstances which they may encounter.

As far as future traffic pattern is concerned, the CACCOLAS were given the standard communications briefing about varying times and places of transmission. No hard and fast ~~distances~~ ^{security information} were laid down, but the men were advised not to attempt contacts more often than once every 2 weeks. The length of any message was to be no longer than 120 groups.

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Mission briefing began as early as January with the individual study of target areas. The basic CACCOLA mission with its stress on legalization and O/I reporting was also explained to the trainees about this time, and consequently referred to in the hours devoted to reporting and message writing.

DZ study and, for the most part, the assignment of the special tasks which several of the trainees were charged with, was not begun until the first week in April, 2-3 weeks before dispatch.

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The problem of the trainees' desire to look up relatives was one which had to be dealt with individually and could not be solved with a flat prohibition. Although in most cases we strongly advised the trainees against such contacts, in instances where the trainee felt very strongly about the advantages of looking up a relative, as was the case with CACCOLA 28, we felt it wiser to accede and be able to lay down the conditions under which the meetings would take place rather than take the chance that the agent would disregard our instructions on this point and proceed on his own initiative once inside as had been the case with CACCOLA 5.

The lack of a specific, predetermined plan of action for the first few months following the drop is particularly evident in the cases of the doubleton teams. This is so not only because of our inability to foresee and predict what conditions the agents will be faced with once they hit the ground and because we feel that putting the agents almost completely on their own initiative during the initial period gives them the maximum chance for survival, but also because this flexibility provides an added measure of security during this critical and difficult phase of the operation. In the case of all 3 doubleton teams, the team members were to split up within 3-4 days after the drop; in no case can an agent know what his partner plans to do after they separate as none of the agents know for certain what specific plan of action they themselves are going to follow. Security-wise, the weakest spots in the operation plans of the doubleton teams are probably the following: (1) the fact that each agent knows the general area in which his partner has cached his equipment, an area to which he must eventually return in order to recover his radio and establish W/T contact, and (2) the fact that none of the agents, going to the prearranged meeting place some 4-8 weeks later, has any way of knowing whether or not his partner has been picked up during the interval. All of the agents were fully aware of these dangers and were briefed that perhaps the best way of mitigating them was to try to pick up their radios as soon as possible and to try to establish W/T contact with Headquarters before the first meeting with their partner. Working against this solution to the problem is the justifiably strong psychological tendency on the part of an agent who has not been in the U.S.S.R. for perhaps 10 years to make an "orientation trip" without any compromising equipment with him. The pros and cons of sending in doubleton teams at all have been discussed before.

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(b) Leaflet Matrices: It will be noted that each of the men carried the new CAPABLE 1 silk screen process for the preparation and reproduction of propaganda leaflets. This was wrapped up in a bundle ready for burial. The CACCOLA B agents are not to engage in propaganda distribution themselves, at least not without specific instructions from us; the leaflet production materials were sent in as a reserve for possible Aktivist utilization in the future.

(c) Mail Communications: Our experience with CACCOLAS 5 and 6 has taught us that W/T for a resident agent in a "legal" status is a limited communications channel at best, while the possibilities of at least one way communication through the mail appear to be far greater than we had formerly supposed. Because of this, the desirability of amplifying W/T messages through S/W letters was given considerable emphasis in the agents' briefing. The agents were taught the use of a well-known but effective system -- blood -- which has the great advantage that there is no need for taking any compromising S/W materials or inks, and no problem of resupply. To cover the security hazard in using a well-known S/W system of this sort, the agents were provided with extra cipher pads for use in S/W, and told to cipher all S/W messages which could affect their own security if developed by the censors -- reports of a more general nature, such as a report on the reactions of the population to the death of Stalin, could be written without cipherment. The agents were instructed to use real names and addresses selected out of the phone book for return addresses, and to mail the letters only by dropping them into mailboxes. A list of the mailing addresses and safety/danger signals assigned to each man is attached. As in the past, an emergency cipher system was assigned to each man by CAPABLE 7, to which he holds the keys. A list of the S/W - Cipher indicators will be forwarded separately.

(d) Documentation:

Thanks to the experienced efforts of ☐ the documentation was one of the brightest spots in the CACCOLA B preparations. With the possible exception of the Leningrad Voennyi Bilet indicator (supplied by CACCOLA 6) all the passport and VB indicators were genuine, as were many of the employment and propisan cachets. The choice of passport printings for use in those passports issued in 1951, 52, and 53 is admittedly open to question, but we feel that in view of the complexity of the Soviet document system, a mistake here can probably pass for an anomalous issue. The MGB and Ispravtrudlager documents are very much the "artist's conception" both in format and contents, and the agents were advised of this; these documents were intended for use in extraordinary circumstances only. The blank documents, blank validating cachets and Holfont unit with accompanying MGB and MVD plastics that were furnished each man made the basis of a fine falsification kit and gave the agents unprecedented opportunity to improvise their own documentation.

With exception of the birth certificates, fill-in was done almost entirely by the CAPABLE 1 instructors at the CACCOLA school. CACCOLA 8 filled in all the VB's; CACCOLA 13, most of the passports; while CACCOLA 3 and CAPABLE 14 filled in most of the Trud Knizhkas and supporting documentation. The active participation of the CAPABLE 1 instructors in this ticklish and argument

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provoking part of the proceedings was good both for security -- obviating the need to rely on CALLIDO, Mrs. CALLIDO and CAVAN -- and because it gave them a chance to see at first hand the problems involved in document preparation and took away any grounds they might have had for criticism. The results were excellent, and the agents themselves more than satisfied. We wish to thank ☐ ☐ for his unceasing cooperation; his careful and patient approach made an excellent impression on both the trainees and CAPABLE 1 instructors.

A full report on the CACCOLA B documentation together with attached photographs has already been pouched by ☐ ☐ under EGMA-5885.

(c) Legends:

Legend briefing began in early January with the study of military legends. The military legends, as in the past, were based on outlines supplied by ZIPPER. Once again, this proved to be a thoroughly unsatisfactory arrangement. These outlines were often factually incorrect, contained many inaccurate renditions of names and places and, above all, were completely barren of the type of detail -- names of unit commanders and personnel, descriptions of battles and barracks life -- which is needed to give an agent confidence in his legend. Unfortunately, the Headquarters amplifications of these military legend outlines were of no use at all to the CACCOLA operation because they were received here only long after legend study had been completed. As it was, the military legends were reworked by CACCOLA 3 on the basis of the DRC and other reports available in the O/I section's files; considering the limited amount of material available he did an excellent job.

Post-Military Legends: The post-military legends were worked out by the CACCOLA instructors on the basis of materials -- defector debriefings, city briefs, maps and plans -- provided by the O/I section. These materials, although containing many shortcomings from the point of view of legend preparation, were on the whole quite satisfactory, and represented an enormous advance over the previous year. In many cases we were embarrassed by an over-abundance of information. The cooperation and support extended by the whole O/I section was excellent throughout.

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CACCOLA 10

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Target Area: Odessa

DZ Area: App. 3 Kms south of Shirokaya Greblya (2801 E, 4932 N)

Date of Dispatch: 25 April 1953

CACCOLA 10's mission was rather different from the others in that he was supposed to exfiltrate after 12-18 months, and because he was trained in photography and equipped with photographic equipment -- a Minox and a Leica.

CACCOLAS 10 and 28 were planning to cache all their equipment in the woods near the DZ (in separate places) on the first or second day following the jump, then proceed together to Khmelnik. If conditions permitted, they were planning to hold a W/T contact prior to caching their equipment, but the fact that it was raining in the DZ area at the time of the jump is probably the reason why this contact did not take place. CACCOLAS 10 and 28 planned to take a train together as far as Kalinovka, where they would split up. CACCOLA 10 planned to proceed immediately to Odessa for a preliminary reconnaissance; if everything went well, he was to return to the Vinnitsa area after a few weeks to get his W/T set and bring it to Odessa. During the first month, CACCOLA 10 was to investigate possibilities of obtaining documents, employment and residence in Odessa, and to survey controls.

The first meeting with CACCOLA 28 was to take place exactly one month from the day they split up, at 1800 hours, at the top of the big steps leading from the harbor in Odessa. If the meeting failed to take place, the alternative meeting was to take place a week later, same time, at the bottom of the same steps. Safety/danger signals for the meetings were worked out by CACCOLAS 10 and 28 themselves. If neither of the meetings materialized, future contact was to be arranged via W/T with Headquarters.

The purpose of this initial meeting is to give CACCOLA 10, who knows Odessa well and who will have had an opportunity to reconnoiter the city, a chance to brief CACCOLA 28 on conditions there. After this meeting they were to split up again and work independently, each communicating with Headquarters via W/T and S/W.

CACCOLA 10 was to attempt to obtain work and residence in Odessa, remaining there until spring of 1954. During this period, he was to establish and maintain W/T contact with Headquarters, collect and transmit O/I and political-economic intelligence. A special aspect of his mission is the collection and photography of all possible document exemplars, the film and originals to be either passed out through REDSKIN channels, or to be brought out by CACCOLA 10 himself when he exfiltrates.

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Exfiltration: CACCOLA 10 was given general area briefing on three border areas: the Norwegian, the Turkish and the Caucasus-Iranian. He was told that he would be given specific instructions over W/T, with the probable time of exfiltration being in summer 1954. In the event that he was unable to maintain W/T contact with us, he was to attempt to obtain a job in Murmansk Oblast', then cross the Norwegian border on his own.

The exfiltration arrangements for CACCOLA 10, in the event that he is in radio contact with us next spring, are at the moment extremely vague. If all goes well on the CAREFREE operation, the Norwegian border probably looks like the best bet, particularly if an escort can be provided. We strongly urge that the possibilities of a seaplane pick-up be also considered. Providing that CACCOLA 10 can move up to Murmansk Oblast' or to the Karelo-Finnish SSR, taking his W/T set with him, such a pick-up would be entirely feasible.

Contact with Relatives: Although CACCOLA 10 had an uncle living in Odessa, he did not consider that the man could be of much use to him and consequently did not plan on trying to contact him. Because of the many people in Kherson who knew him and would be liable to recognize him, CACCOLA 10 planned to stay out of that city.

Legend Outline: Born 28 Feb. 1924 in Odessa. Finished 7 yrs school in Kherson in 1938. Moved to Kaluga. Mobilized in Kaluga 15 Feb. 1942. Demobilized Nov. 1947, went to Uzhgorod because of reputed higher standard of living there. From Nov. 1947 to April 1953, worked as a chauffeur at the Spirtzavod in Veliko Lazy, near Uzhgorod. Voyennyi Bilet: Uzhgorod, Jan. 1948; Pasport: Uzhgorod, Nov. 1952.

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A to EGMA-5939

(e-2)

CACCOLA 20**КАПОК**

Target Area: Kiev

DZ Area: Approx. 15 Kms NW of Novograd-Volynskiy

Date of Dispatch: 25 April 1953

Mission: CACCOLA 20 was to attempt to establish himself in the Kiev area, to maintain W/T contact from there, to collect and transmit O/I and political intelligence, and to carry out the general CACCOLA mission. No other assignment was given him.

Plans for Initial Period: After landing CACCOLAS 20 and 21 were to bury their chutes at the DZ, then move with all their equipment away from the DZ, that same night, in the general direction of Novograd-Volynskiy. On the following day, if all was quiet, one of them was to attempt to establish W/T contact with us. That night they were to separate and cache their equipment as far away from each other as possible; each man was instructed to adopt zigzag tactics to prevent the other from being able to guess the direction of his cache. Early the following morning CACCOLA 20 was to head in toward Novograd-Volynskiy, toward the SE part of town and take a train from the RR station Novograd-Volynskiy II to Zhitomir (according to the 1950 RR timetable, the Khar'kov-L'vov train leaves Nov.-Vol. II daily at 0912 hrs). CACCOLA 20 was planning to proceed from Zhitomir to Kiev, where he would make his preliminary reconnaissance, look around for new documents, and investigate employment and residence possibilities. After the meeting CACCOLA 21, CACCOLA 20 was to return to pick up his set and bring it to the Kiev area.

In the event that the possibilities for getting set up in the immediate vicinity of Kiev itself did not appear to be too promising at first, CACCOLA 20 was free to start out in one of the smaller towns in the Oblast', always with the aim of eventually moving into Kiev itself.

Contact with CACCOLA 21: Just before separating CACCOLAS 20 and 21 were to agree on the exact time for their first meeting. The place was to be in the main park in Kiev, and the approximate time about 4-6 weeks after they split up. Safety/Danger signals had been worked out between them. At this first meeting they could share the ops information each had acquired during the first month. Future meetings were to be coordinated through Headquarters via W/T or S/W.

Contact with Relatives: CACCOLA 20 had no relatives or friends in the U.S.S.R. whom he wished to contact, and did not plan to go near his native Stalino Oblast'.

Legend Outline: (1) Born 1927 in Budennovka. Finished 5 classes school in Elenovka in 1940. Mobilized Sept. 1943 in Stalino after reoccupation area by Red Army. Demobilized 2 March 1951, went to Rovno. Worked as an accountant

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in the Rovno Avto-Transportnaya Kontora from March 1951 to April 1953.
VB: issued Rovno, March 1951; Pasport: issued in Rovno March 1951.

(2) Born 1925 in Budennovka. Finished 7 classes school in Elenovka in 1940. Mobilized Sept. 1943 in Stalino. Demobilized March 1950, went to Rovno. Worked as accountant in Rovno ATK from March 1950 to April 1953.

NOTE: Because of his youthful appearance, it was very difficult for CACCOLA 20 to pass for more than 26 years of age (he was actually born in 1928). However, we do not possess the demobilization Ukazes for any class later than 1925. Hence it was decided to furnish CACCOLA 20 with 2 sets of documentation. During the first period, while he was looking for new documents and trying to get set up, he was to use the documents and legends which gave his birth date as 1927, which most nearly corresponded with his appearance; we feel that it is extremely unlikely that any militiaman making a document check would know the proper date of the demobilization Ukaz for the class of 1927. If CACCOLA 20 is unable to acquire new documents and is forced to register with the ones we furnished him, he is supposed to switch to the second set of documents, which have the correct demobilization Ukaz.

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CACCOLA 21

~~KAPOK~~

Target Area: Kiev (Khar'kov as alternate)

DZ Area: Same as CACCOLA 20

Date of Dispatch: 25 April 1953

Mission: CACCOLA 21 was to attempt to establish himself in the Kiev area, to maintain W/T contact from there, to collect and transmit O/I and political intelligence, and to carry out the general CACCOLA mission. CACCOLA 20 was also briefed on the Khar'kov and told that if he found it difficult to get set up in Kiev he should proceed to Khar'kov, a city he knew fairly well from before the war.

Plans for Initial Period: After separating from CACCOLA 20 in the DZ area (See CACCOLA 20 mission plan), CACCOLA 21 was to cache his equipment and proceed on the following morning to the main RR station in Novograd-Volynskiy and take the train to Korosten' (the daily L'vov-Kiev train which leaves Novograd-Volynskiy I at 0707 according to the 1950 timetable). From that point he was to proceed in the same manner as CACCOLA 20.

Contact with CACCOLA 20: See CACCOLA 20 Mission Plan.

Contact with Relatives: None planned.

Legend Outline: Born 1924 in Novo-Virki, Sumi Oblast'. Finished 8 classes in Slovetchina in 1939. Mobilized in Kupyansk, Khar'kov Oblast' in August 1941. Demobilized Nov. 1947, went to Rovno. From Nov. 1947 to April 1953 worked as an expediter in the Alcohol Works in Shpanovo, near Rovno. VB: issued in Rovno, Feb. 1948; Pasport: issued in Rovno, Nov. 1952.

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CACCOLA 22

Target Area: Bryansk

KAPOK

DZ: Approx. 25 Kms N of Smorgon'

Date of Dispatch: 29 April 1953

Mission: CACCOLA 22 was to attempt to legalize in the vicinity of Bryansk, establish and maintain W/T contact, and to carry out the general CACCOLA mission from there. In addition he had the following assignments:

1. Delivery of resupply package for CACCOLA 6: CACCOLA 22 was given a package, sealed in oilskin, which he was to place in a dead drop as near as possible to Leningrad. This package, intended for CACCOLA 6, contained the following items:

- (a) 20,000 rubles, in 100-ruble notes.
- (b) A small rubber leaflet impression giving wave lengths and broadcast times of the CAPABLE 1 radio.
- (c) 2 copies of a recent CAPABLE 1 brochure which summarizes the CAPABLE 1 program
- (d) A typewritten message of greetings.

Although the selection of the actual dead drop location was left up to CACCOLA 22, it was stipulated that it should be near one of the RR lines leading out of Leningrad to the south (Leningrad-Pskov, Leningrad-Novgorod, Leningrad-Orsha), and that it should be within one day's round trip RR travel from Leningrad. CACCOLA 22 was to carry out this task immediately after leaving the DZ area (see below). CACCOLA 22 was briefed on the importance of transmitting the location of the drop as soon as possible after depositing the package, but it is likely that there will be a time lag of several weeks, as he will have to return to the DZ area to pick up his radio.

2. Reconnaissance of Bryansk Woods: This assignment was outlined in EGMA-2877, Operational Plan #4, Para 3(b). CACCOLA 22 was supplied with the following 1:100,000 RGS maps of Bryansk Oblast' supplied by Headquarters: N 36/79-82, 91-94, 103-106, 115-118, 127-130, 139-141. These maps were printed on cloth. A copy of the instructions given CACCOLA 22 is attached. No time limit was set for the carrying out of this assignment.

Plans for Initial Period: CACCOLA 22 and 27 were to split up on the day following the jump. CACCOLA 22 planned to carry his gear another night to the south (toward Smorgon'), cache everything except his clothes, documents and money, and the package for CACCOLA 6, near Smorgon', and then continue on, still moving through the woods at night, toward Molodechno. He was planning to hike all the way to Molodechno (37 kms from Smorgon') before attempting to come out of the black and board a train, and the RR stations of

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Zales'ie (13 kms from Smorgon') and Prudy (23 kms from Smorgon') along his way in case the going got too difficult. Taking a train at Molodechno, CACCOLA 22 was to proceed immediately toward Leningrad, either directly from Molodechno, via Minsk and Orsha, or even via Moscow. Getting off the train a few stations from Leningrad (but within about 100 Kms) he was to select a dead drop, cache the package for CACCOLA 6 there, then make a swing back toward Smorgon', travelling through Bryansk if possible, so as to select a spot for keeping his W/T set. After picking up his radio CACCOLA 22 was to proceed to Bryansk where he would attempt to get a job, a place to live, new documents, and settle down in general. His first W/T contact, in which he would transmit the location of the dead drop was to be held as soon as possible, but would depend on the availability of power as the battery will have lost its charge by then.

Contact with Relatives: CACCOLA 22 was very eager to try and locate his mother who he thought might be able to help him. Details on her are provided in CACCOLA 22's Biographical Data (Att A to MGMA-10218). When CACCOLA 22 last heard of her in 1944 she was living in Lopandino. If he succeeded in locating her, CACCOLA 22 was planning to tell her that he had spent the last 5-6 years in prison, and to conceal from her the fact that he had been in Germany and was now engaged in revolutionary work. CACCOLA 22 was not to try to locate his mother until after he had gotten set up in the Bryansk area and had established W/T contact with us, but this plan was, of course, subject to revision.

Legend Outline: Born 1924 in Liudinovo. Finished 6 classes school in Liudinovo in 1939. Mobilized in Bryansk in August 1941. Demobilized in February 1948. Feb. 1948-Apr. 1953, worked as foreman of junkyard for the Leningrad city office of Glavutyl'syrya. VB: issued in Leningrad in Feb. 1948. Pasport: issued in Leningrad in Feb. 1953.

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CACOLA 22 -- Instructions for the Reconnaissance of the Bryansk Woods

Goal: To find 2 or 3 places in the Bryansk woods for the concealment of our people, when needed by the Operational Staff.

Time Needed: 4-5 months (temperate weather).

Requirements of Areas:

1. Must be remote and protected enough to give cover against enemy activity.
2. Should allow maneuverability, access to enemy lines of communication and transportation.
3. Must answer the normal requirements for a black base:
 - (a) availability of fresh water.
 - (b) availability of edible fauna and flora; possibility of storing food there.
4. Accessibility to 2 or 3 good DZ's, if possible one landing field for small aircraft.

Method of Reconnaissance:

On the basis of your maps, pick out 2 or 3 seemingly suitable areas for further investigation on the ground. Gather all available information on the areas (both through the collection of applicable literature, and through questioning of local inhabitants). Make a thorough examination of the areas on foot, and, on the basis of your findings, make the appropriate recommendations to Headquarters.

In the case of an affirmative answer from Headquarters be prepared to make further reconnaissance of the given area, together with making corrections on the maps, paying particular attention to paths and approaches, possible escape routes, camp sites, etc.

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CACCOLA 24

~~KAPOK~~

Target Area: Moscow

DZ Area: Approx. 20 Kms east of Maikop

Date of Dispatch: 23 April 1953

Mission: CACCOLA 24 was to attempt to legalize in the Moscow area, establish and maintain W/T contact and carry out the general CACCOLA mission there. Because of the difficulties involved in getting established in the Moscow area, CACCOLA 24 was not charged with any additional assignments.

Plans for Initial Period: CACCOLAS 24 and 26 were to cache their radios and other equipment in separate places in the DZ area, then proceed together through the woods to Maikop on the second or third day following the drop. Although they planned to hold a contact before caching their W/T sets, failure to do so ^{is} possibly attributable to the extremely poor weather conditions on the DZ, and to the possibility that one or both of them were dropped into trees. From Maikop, CACCOLAS 24 and 26 were to take a train together as far as Armavir, where they would split up. After parting with CACCOLA 26, CACCOLA 24 planned to take an orientation trip of about 2-4 weeks, going from Armavir to Rostov and perhaps to Stalingrad prior to returning to Maikop to pick up his W/T set. During this initial trip he would buy new clothes, look for documents and try to recapture the feeling of Soviet life. After returning to the DZ area for his W/T set CACCOLA 24 planned to follow one of two alternatives: either to take his radio to some previously selected cache (near Rostov, for example) and then to proceed toward Moscow, returning later for the radio, or to travel to Moscow together with his radio. Although in all instances CACCOLA 24 was strongly advised to take his W/T set as soon and as far as possible so as to cut down on unnecessary travel and eliminate some of the security hazards involved in returning to a cache of this type after a lengthy interval of time, his actual actions will of course be largely determined by the conditions he meets during the first month, and by his state of mind at the time.

One other possible course of action should be noted: if things looked quiet and peaceful in Maikop when CACCOLAS 24 and 26 first emerged from the DZ area, they were planning to consider going immediately back to pick up their W/T sets and take them with them to some point on the Maikop-Moscow route before caching them. (According to this version of the plan, they would still split up at Armavir, and each man would then decide where he was going to leave his set -- somewhere near Rostov is likely for both of them.) This plan was strongly urged on them by the case officers, because of the travel and security advantages, but the strong psychological factors working against this course of action should not be minimized.

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Contact with CACCOLA 26: Because of the length of the journey before them and the uncertainty of their initial plans, CACCOLAS 24 and 26 were to make their arrangements for a meeting just before they split up. The first meeting was to be at some point along the route to Moscow, possibly Rostov, and the time approximately a month after they split up. In this way, each could take advantage of whatever the other had learned, particularly about documentation, in the course of their initial "orientation" journey. Future meetings were to be coordinated via W/T with Headquarters.

Contact with Relatives: CACCOLA 24 had a number of relatives in Irkutsk and Blagoveshchensk whom he was eager to locate, but agreed not to attempt to do so without express permission from Headquarters. Although he was satisfied with his mission and target area, his real desire was to work in the Soviet Far East where he was born and brought up, and we suggest that his future use as a contact man for a black base located in the Primorskii Krai should be kept in mind, should he manage to legalize himself and establish W/T contact.

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Communication Through Mails: The volume of correspondence between Soviet Import and Export Ministries and various firms in Berlin and Western Germany, suggested to us a gimmick to be tried by CACCOLAS 24 and 26. On the basis of intercepts of this correspondence which were provided by CIS in Berlin, MKTOPAZ printed up masthead stationery and envelopes for the following Soviet enterprises: SOJUZNEFTEXPORT, SOJUKHIMIMPORT, RAZNOIMPORT, TECHNOPROMIMPORT, EXPORTLES, and MEZHDUNARODNAYA KNIGA. Using the actual correspondence as a guide, we then typed up a number of cover letters (mostly in German and English) to a selected list of firms in West Berlin, addressed the envelopes, and gave about 24 such prepared letters each to CACCOLAS 24 and 26. Upon arrival in Moscow, the agents have only to write their S/W message across the letter, steam and press it, fill in the date and signature of the cover letter in ink, put a stamp on the envelope, and drop the letter in a mailbox near to the actual location of the enterprise from which the letter is supposedly coming. In Berlin, all mail going to the designated firms will be intercepted by CIS and handed over to Howard D. Melendy who can compare the cover texts to the photos of the ones supplied CACCOLAS 24 and 26, and pull out the appropriate letters.

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We feel it likely that even in the event that the Soviet enterprises in question normally deliver their outgoing mail direct to the post office, the occasional appearance of one of their envelopes in a mail box will not occasion particular surprise on the part of the mailman, but will be ascribed to forgetfulness on the part of some employee. Granted that the interception mechanism in Berlin is somewhat cumbersome and that one of the letters could slip through and be delivered to the addressee, it is unlikely that in the resulting confusion anyone would suspect what the actual origin of the letter was. Finally, the risk to the agent is minimal, as even if one of the two CACCOLAS is picked up and the letters found on him, the two were not furnished with letters from the same enterprises, and at any rate, a permanent watch on all the mailboxes in the vicinity of Smolenskaya Ploshchad', for example, would seem to us to be quite impractical. There is no danger of the agent overworking this communications channel as the month is typed in in all the letters, while the day was

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left blank to be filled in with ink (as is the actual practice in all the enterprises concerned).

Unfortunately, due to the fact that these letters were not prepared until the last minute, there was no time to assign special safety/danger indicators. (In their normal mail correspondence, the assigned safety/danger indicators appear in the cover text itself.)

The following is a list of the Soviet enterprises, Berlin addressees, and months of the cover letters assigned to CACCOLA 24:

From:

SOJUZNEFTEXPORT

A. & L. Rittel
Berlin W 15
Duisburgerstr. 20

May
✓ October

Weidehoff und Schulte
Berlin-Charlottenburg 2
Hardenbergstrasse, 12

April
August
February

EXPORTIES

A. & L. Rittel
Duisburgerstr. 20
Berlin W 15

Nov.
Aug.
Feb.

Born
Mercantil G.m.b.H.
Berlin-Wilmersdorf
Konstanzer Strasse 15

Oct.
July ✓
Apr.
Jan.

W. Rex & Co.
Berlin W 15
Bleibtreustrasse 31

March
June
Sept. Dec.

TECHNOPROMMORT

Herbert Priebe
Berlin-Wannsee
Niebelungenstr. 13

April
March
Sept.

Cahn & Schurmann O.H.G.
Berlin-Zehlendorf
Wolzogenstr. 15

Jan.
July
Nov.

Schwedische Handels
Trauhand Gesellschaft
Berlin-Wilmersdorf

Dec.
June

Legend Outline: Born 1921 in Alekseevka, Amur Oblast'. Finished 9 classes school in Irkutsk in 1939. Mobilized in Smolensk in June 1941. Demobilized in May 1946, went to Astrakhan'. August 1946 to Jan. 1948 worked as accountant in the artel' Remstroitel in Astrakhan'. Feb 1948 to Apr 1953, worked as foreman of the junkyard for the Astrakhan' office of Glavutyl'syrya. VB: issued Astrakhan' in Jan 1948; Pasport: issued in Astrakhan' June 1951.

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~~SECRET~~CACCOLA 26~~KAPOK~~

Target Area: Moscow

DZ Area: Same as CACCOLA 24

Dispatch Date: 23 April 1953

Mission: Same as CACCOLA 24.

Plans for Initial Period: After splitting up with CACCOLA 24 (see CACCOLA 24 Plan), CACCOLA 26 was thinking of travelling on to Rostov, at which point he would decide to remain in Rostov until the meeting with CACCOLA 24, take a swing through the Donbas, or return for his W/T set.

Contact with CACCOLA 24: See CACCOLA 24 Mission Plan.

Contact with Relatives: Although CACCOLA 26 had a father and step-mother whom he presumed were still living in Liudinovo, Bryansk Oblast', he had no intention of trying to get in touch with them if things were going well (he was not on good terms with his step-mother); however, in the event that everything else had failed, if he were unable to obtain new documents and found it impossible to use the ones we furnished him with, he also had a document made out in his true name: an amnesty spravka from a labor camp which indicated that he had been imprisoned for the last years and was now being released. With this document and an accordingly revised legend CACCOLA 26 could try to locate his parents in case of dire need; it should be stressed, however, that CACCOLA 26 was saving this as a last resort as he knew that most of the other CACCOLAS knew his true name, which he lived under in Morocco.

<u>From:</u>	<u>To:</u>	<u>Month</u>
RAZNOIMPORT	Fernand J.E. Mueller Berlin-Zehlendorf-West Kleiststrasse 9	May Jan. Sept.
	P. Lehrs & Co. Berlin W. 35 Schöneberger Ufer 5-9	June March Aug.
	Deutscher Innen & Aussen- handel Elektrotechnik Berlin W 8 Mauerstrasse 77	Oct. Feb. July
MEZHDUNARODNAYA KNIGA	Mercantil GmbH Berlin-Wilmersdorf Konstanzer Str 15	Dec.
	KAWK Kommissionsbuch- handlung GmbH Berlin-Charlottenburg 2	Oct.

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Hermann Geisser
 Berlin-Friedenau
 Cranachstr. 17

May

Prof. M. Brandt
 Berlin-DDR
 Städtisches Krankenhaus Mosbit
 Turmstr. 21

Nov
 June

SOJUZIMEXPORT

Carl Ludwig Knueppel
 Berlin-Tempelhof
 Parkstrasse 1a

June
 Nov.

Gustav Kecks & Co.
 Berlin SW 68
 Ritterstrasse 12

May
 Dec.
 March
 Sept. ✓

Herrmann & Riefenstahl
 Berlin SO 36
 Waldemarstr., 33

Jan.
 April.
 July
 Oct.

Legend Outline: Born 1925 in Novgorod. Finished 7 classes school in Liudinovo in 1941. Mobilized in Liudinovo in Oct 1943. Demobilized Oct. 1950, went to Astrakhan'. Oct 1950-April 1953, worked as an accountant in the artel' Derevoobdelochnik in Astrakhan'. VB: issued in Astrakhan' Oct. 1950; Pasport: issued in Astrakhan', Oct 1950.

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CACCOLA 27

~~REPORT~~

Target Area: Minsk

DZ Area: Same as CACCOLA 22

Date of Dispatch: 29 April 1953

Mission: CACCOLA 27 was to attempt to legalize in the vicinity of Minsk, establish and maintain W/T contact and carry out the general CACCOLA mission there. In addition, he was charged with the following tasks:

1. The caching of a resupply package for the AEQUORS (see below).
2. The caching of a resupply package for CACCOLA 5. This package contained

(a) 20,000 rubles.

(b) A small rubber leaflet imprint giving wave lengths and broadcast times of the CAPABLE 1 radio.

(c) 2 copies of a recent CAPABLE 1 brochure which summarizes the CAPABLE 1 program.

(d) A typewritten message of greetings.

3. Brest Dead Drops. CACCOLA 27 was briefed that after he managed to get set up in the Minsk area, he should attempt to go to Brest for the purpose of surveying controls there and to set up 2 or 3 dead-drops whose locations he would then radio to us. CACCOLA 27 was briefed to attempt this trip legally only, and not to risk going there black. In the event that he was unable to find a legitimate pretext for making such a trip or to obtain propusk, he was to try to become acquainted with people -- such as railroadmen and truck drivers -- who made the Minsk-Brest trip periodically, and to report on their identities by W/T if he felt that they could be recruited as either witting or unwitting accomplices.

4. E-11 Mission: Target Dossier E-11 arrived at CSOB only two weeks before the date scheduled for CACCOLA 27's dispatch, which was, of course, much too late to prepare an operational plan, brief CACCOLA 27 on the requirements and give him the necessary specialized reporting training. Also, this mission -- with its long term observation requirements -- did not appear to us to be consonant with the legalization in Minsk called for in CACCOLA 27's original mission plan. What we attempted to do instead, in the time available to us, was to brief CACCOLA 27 on the layout of the rail system and its importance, explain the significance of Zhabinka, stress the items worthy of observation, and in general to give him an understanding of the

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target as a whole. An outline of this orientation briefing is attached. CACCOLA 27's instructions were that in the event he personally had occasion to travel from Minsk to Brest by RR in implementation of (3) above, he was, of course, to keep his eyes open and report on anything which seemed to him unusual in the light of the attached briefing, but that in general, he was to concentrate on trying to spot likely sources of information, particularly RR men working at any point between Minsk and Brest, and on reporting them to Headquarters. This spotting, together with the information on travel and residence restrictions and controls between Minsk and Brest which CACCOLA 27 can be expected to supply, can serve as the basis for mounting a well-prepared operation against this target next year. Or, if CACCOLA 27 should spot a likely informant, say a brakeman on the Minsk-Brest run, he can be instructed to attempt to recruit him himself if this appears to be advisable. CACCOLA 27 can then pass the information from this source on by W/T, S/W, or via the dead-drops in Brest if that channel is ever set up.

5. Reconnaissance of Gomel Oblast: As a long range task, CACCOLA 27 was instructed to reconnoiter the woods and marshes of his native Gomel Oblast for the purpose of selecting and reporting on appropriate areas for black bases, DZ's, and landing grounds. This information, as in the case of CACCOLA 22, is necessary for us to be able to select likely rendezvous points for CACCOLA agents in the event of outbreak of war. To help him carry out this reconnaissance, which was to be undertaken only when an opportunity presented itself, CACCOLA 27 was given 1:250,000 map coverage (AMS 501 series) of Mogilev, Gomel and Minsk Oblasts.

Plans for Initial Period: CACCOLAS 22 and 27 were to gather on the DZ, bury their chutes and move together through the woods that night in a southerly direction. The following day they were to split up. Before leaving the woods, CACCOLA 27 was to place the two packages he was charged with in dead drops (not closer than 1 Km apart), hold a W/T contact and transmit the location of the drops. Although the actual selection of the dead-drop sites was up to CACCOLA 27 himself, the general area was to be somewhere east of Smorgon', either along the Vilnius-Molodechno RR line, or along one of the roads leading into Smorgon'. Describability was to be the dominant factor in the selection of the drop. The AEQUOR package was labeled "1" and the CACCOLA 5 package labeled "2", and CACCOLA 27 was briefed to report on the dead-drop locations in the same way. CACCOLA 27 was told that the packages contained money and "other things" for previous CACCOLAS, and was warned not to get the packages mixed up. He was properly impressed with the importance of reporting on the location of the drops as soon as possible after caching. Because of the importance of this latter factor, CACCOLA 27 was the only one of all the men from whom a contact could definitely have been expected during the first week after landing. According to the plan, he was to return to his set after setting up the two dead drops near Smorgon', transmit the location of the drops, cache his W/T set, and then go into Smorgon' and take the train to Minsk. It is, of course, very difficult to try to guess what went wrong in this plan, but the fact that the actual DZ was 10-15 kilometers north of the proposed DZ (because of the heavy overcast) must have been a factor. Thus, instead of

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Attachment to BGMA-5939

(e-7, cont'd)

landing 12 Kms away from the Vilnius-Molodechno RR line, CACCOLA was faced with the prospect of hiking 25 kilometers down to the RR line area to locate and service the drops, then hiking 25 kms back to his W/T set to hold a contact, then, having cached his W/T set and other equipment, having to travel the whole distance once again to take strain at Smorgon'. The other alternatives to this were to carry his radio and other equipment the full 25 kms to start with a long hike with that much of a pack -- or to set up the drops somewhere in the vicinity of the DZ, a poor choice because of the inaccessibility of the area.

CACCOLA 27, who never managed to acquire any measure of self-confidence, was particularly nervous about the idea of taking his W/T set from the very start, thus eliminating the necessity to return to the Smorgon' area. Like most of the others he planned to take a trip of 2-4 weeks around the country before returning to pick up his radio. Rather than try to get set up in Minsk immediately, he preferred to try to get a job in some smaller and quieter place at first, such as Mogilev or Gomel, moving to Minsk later.

Contact with Relatives: CACCOLA 27 had no intentions of either returning to his native village, or of trying to locate any relatives or friends.

Legend Outline: Born 1925 in Zhmerinka. Finished 7 classes school in Zhmerinka in 1941. Mobilized in Krasnopol'sk, Mogilev Oblast' in March 1944. Demobilized in April 1950, went to Leningrad. May 1950 to April 1953 worked in the junkyard of the Leningrad office of Glavutyl'syrya as junk receiver. VB: issued in Leningrad in May 1950; Pasport: issued in Leningrad in May 1950.

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CACCOLA 28

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(c-8)

Target Area: Odessa

DZ Area: Same as CACCOLA 10

Date of Dispatch: 25 April 1953

CACCOLA 28's mission called for him to legalize in Odessa, establish and maintain W/T contact with the base, and to collect and transmit O/I and other intelligence in keeping with the general CACCOLA mission. In addition he had the following specific tasks:

1. REDSKIN: After establishing himself in Odessa, CACCOLA 28, upon the receipt of instructions from Headquarters, was to set up several dead drops in the waterfront area and to report on their locations to us. If and when sailors from the foreign ships that call at Odessa can be recruited as couriers, CACCOLA 28 can use these drops as a channel for the sending of reports and document exemplars to us.

2. CRIMEAN SEACOST: Another task assigned to CACCOLA 28 was the reconnaissance of the Crimean coast to assess military and civilian controls in that area, and to pick out and report on possible landing beaches for maritime in and exfiltration. No specific time was set for the execution of this assignment, the requirement being placed on an availability basis. CACCOLA 28 was given a general briefing on the Crimean area and supplied with 1:250,000 map coverage of the coast.

Plans for Initial Period: Immediately after splitting up with CACCOLA 10,

CACCOLA 28 was to proceed to his home town Lisichansk (via Kiev and Poltava) where he planned to look for his older brother. This brother, Ivan Vassilievich LYAKHNO (LIACHNO), born 1917, was a party member and the manager of an oil refinery in Lisichansk. CACCOLA 28 last heard of him in 1948, in a letter from his mother. Although he felt that he could rely on his brother completely, CACCOLA 28 did not plan to reveal to him that he had been out of the country, but to tell him that he had been in jail and to ask him to help him with new documents. As CACCOLA 28 was only 16 when last in Lisichansk, and as his appearance had changed considerably in the meantime (he now wears glasses), he did not feel that there was much chance that someone else would recognize him.

Regardless of whether or not he managed to contact his brothers, CACCOLA 28 planned to proceed to Odessa in time for the meeting with CACCOLA 10 one month after their parting (see CACCOLA 10 Mission Plan).

After the meeting with CACCOLA 10, CACCOLA 28 was to return to the DZ area to pick up his W/T set and bring it back to Odessa, where he would attempt to settle down. CACCOLA 28 planned to attempt to enter some educational institution if at all possible (a technical school or something of the sort), otherwise to look for work.

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(e-8 cont'd)

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Legend Outline: Born 28 May 1924 in Lisichansk. Finished 9 classes schooling in Lisichansk in 1941. Mobilized in Lisichansk in Oct. 1941. Demobilized, together with his friend CACCOLA 10, in Nov. 1947. Went to Uzhgorod. From Nov. 1947 to April 1953, worked at the Spirtzavod in Veliko Lazy as an accountant. VB: issued Uzhgorod, Jan. 1948; Pasport: issued Uzhgorod, Dec. 1952.

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~~MAPON~~

8. CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT:

An initial mission equipment list was prepared in December for Eugene R. Brettell, charged with outfitting REDSOX projects for dispatch. Later, partly as the result of the dress rehearsal, modifications and additions were made. Remembering the excessive weight of last year's bundles, our efforts were directed at reducing the loads, not with any great success, however.

So that each man while in the woods might carry on his person 40,000 rubles, his crypto pads, crystals and documents, a six pocket pleated money belt of white duck was devised.

The RS-6 radio set was not mounted as last year, but was left in its separate component parts. This makes it much more portable and easier to conceal, as well as somewhat lighter, but means that the set has to be connected together before every contact.

The Tokarev pistols arrived too late to allow more than 1 practice session and most of the trainees experienced considerable difficulty in firing it because of its weight and kick. As a result many of them took instead the 9mm Belgian Browning with its 13 shot clip.

We have found that a great deal of Iron Curtain and even German clothing and equipment are similar to Soviet items, and it is well-known that since the war many satellite items are available in the U.S.S.R. Thus, when Russian items were not available we were not afraid to give the men clothing and equipment from one of the satellite countries. The few articles of American manufacture that were provided were sterilized; even the radio equipment had the English markings removed and Russian equivalents stencilled on (this was done only in the hopes of deceiving a militiaman making a spot check for black market goods; upon close examination all the COMMO gear can easily be proven to be of American manufacture).

Final packing began on 10 April. The trainees were taken in pairs to the Airborne Section's packing room where each was able to watch and memorize the packing of his own bundle. The professional method of Gingell, Lockadoo and Plaistead produced much favorable comment.

Total weights of the bundles were as follows:

CACCOLA 10	49 Kgs	107.8 pounds
CACCOLA 20	52.2 Kgs	114.8 pounds
CACCOLA 21	48.01 Kgs	105.2 pounds
CACCOLA 22	49.00 Kgs	107.8 pounds
CACCOLA 24	46.5 Kgs	102.3 pounds
CACCOLA 26	46.0 Kgs	101.2 pounds
CACCOLA 27	50.0 Kgs	110.0 pounds
CACCOLA 28	55.0 Kgs	121.0 pounds

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~~TOP SECRET~~

The following is a complete list of clothing and equipment carried by the men:

A. On the person of each man:

1. pistol
2. crash helmet
3. stop watch
4. wrist watch
5. money belt
6. wooden pencil stub
7. shoulder holster
8. 1 pack cigarettes
9. combination waterproof compass and matches
10. comb
11. trousers
12. coat
13. shirt
14. socks
15. boots
16. underwear
17. belt
18. wallet
19. maps
20. documents
21. 40,000 rubles

National Origin:

Russian and Bagian
German
German
Swiss
no identity (American made)
sterilized American
no identity (American made)
Russian

no identity (American made)
German
no identity (Eastern Europe)
or
(Russian)
no identity (Eastern Europe
or Russian)
Russian or East German
Russian or East German
Russian
Russian
German or Russian
German or Eastern Europe
Russian (CACCOLAS 10 and 28 -
some U.S. maps)
American made
Russian

B. Carried in or on Bundle of Each Man:

1. suitcase
2. suitcoat
3. trousers
4. 30 Louis d'Or (CACCOLA 28 had 40)
5. towel
6. mirror
7. safety or straight razor
8. bar soap
9. ration chocolate
10. ration salami
11. plastic ruler
12. canteen
13. compass
14. commo notebook
15. 2 cans salami

German
no identity (East German)
no identity (East German)
French, but some assorted (all
Hungarian, Belgian, etc. (pre-
no identity (German) (1914)
no identity (German)
Russian
Russian
no identity (German)
sterilized American
no identity (German)
no identity (German)
German
no identity (German)
sterilized American

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to EGMA-5939

WEEK

16. complete RS-6 radio with spare parts kit and four cell battery
17. document falsification kit
18. 2 flashlight batteries
19. 2 waterproof bags
20. 1 flashlight
21. dog poison
22. shovel, entrenching
23. burlap bag
24. sleeping bag
25. A-6 container w/ lowering strap and sling
26. packboard
27. RR-5 receiver
28. battery charger
29. automatic pencil flashlight
30. propaganda leaflet kit
31. waterproof caching sheet
32. pr. shoes
33. raincoat
34. ammunition
35. release cable

sterilized American
no identity (German)
East and West German
no identity (American)
East and West German
no identity (American)
American
no identity (German)
sterilized American

sterilized American
sterilized American
~~sterilized~~ American
sterilized American
sterilized American
no identity (German)
no identity (American)
East German
no identity (German and
sterilized American
American (7.63) and
Swedish (9 mm)
no identity (American)

C. Other Items:

1. CACCOLA 10:

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| a. Leica Camera III-F | German |
| b. Minox Camera | German |
| c. Leica Copying Lens | German |
| d. 7 x 42 Monocular | German |
| e. Minox Light Meter | German |
| f. Leica Light Meter | German |
| g. 7 rolls film 35 mm 36 Exp Sup XX | German |
| h. 8 rolls Minox film 50 Exp 14/10 Din | German |
| i. 4 rolls Minox film 50 Exp 17/10 Din | German |
| j. 2 rolls Minox film 50 Exp 21/10 Din | German |
| k. carrying case above items | German |
| l. first aid kit | sterilized American |

2. CACCOLA 20:

- | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------|
| a. can insect repellent | Sterilized American |
| b. URC-4 | American |
| c. civilian cap | Russian |

3. CACCOLA 21:

- | | |
|------------------|---------------------|
| a. first aid kit | sterilized American |
|------------------|---------------------|

Security Information

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SECRET4. CACCOLA 22:

- a. ~~URC-4~~
- b. can insect repellent
- c. first aid kit
- d. ruble resupply CACCOLA 6 (20,000)

~~REPORT~~
 American
 sterilized American
 sterilized American
 Russian

5. CACCOLA 24:

- a. URC-4 w/homing beacon
- b. first aid kit
- c. can insect repellent
- d. monocular

American
 sterilized American
 sterilized American
 sterilized American

6. CACCOLA 26:

- a. necktie
- b. first aid kit
- c. civilian cap

Russian
 sterilized American
 Russian

7. CACCOLA 27:

- a. first aid kit
- b. URC-4 w/homing beacon
- c. can insect repellent
- d. ruble resupply CACCOLA 5 (20,000)
- e. document and COMMO resupply
for AEQUOR II team

sterilized American
 American
 sterilized American
 Russian
 sterilized American and
 no identity (American)

8. CACCOLA 28:

- a. necktie
- b. insect repellent
- c. ~~URC-4~~ w/homing beacon
- d. civilian cap

Russian
 sterilized American
 American
 Russian

9. SECURITY:

The school was located in a spacious house isolated on the shore of the Tegernsee, some thirty miles south of Munich. Our prepared cover was an Army language detachment experimenting with new methods of teaching English to recently recruited aliens. We never had to use this cover and failing CE coverage cannot state with certainty our neighborhood reputation. We were forced to disclose the confidential nature of the project to the Engineer and Quartermaster Sections of the Bad Tolz Sub-Post in requesting them to except us from the maintenance inspections conducted regularly in all Army billets.

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Att. to EGMA-5939

In the area of the house the men wore OD uniforms. For volleyball they learned enough English to count up to fifteen, say "out", "in", "change", "what's the score" and swear convincingly.

Once every two weeks the men were given weekend leave in Munich. The men went on leave in pairs (and were forbidden to get together in larger groups), but were not accompanied by the case officers. We have not found constant supervision of intelligent and responsible trainees while on weekend leave to be either necessary or practical and it seems clear that (with the exception of recent defectors who have no knowledge of Western life) there is no point in sending in a trainee whom you cannot trust here. As far as we can ascertain, the men justified the liberty given them in this regard, with the exception of CACCOLA 21 who committed several misdemeanors while on leave and on one occasion was arrested by the German police for fighting in a bar. Two security breaches in the vicinity of the school should be noted: once when CACCOLA 21 was picked up by the MP's on the road outside the school for being drunk and out of uniform, and another serious incident when CACCOLA 10 stole out of the house late at night and was picked up by the MP's in a restaurant in Tegernsee. A search revealed compromising material on him.

The last weekend leave was on 28 and 29 March. The DZ and final briefing was not begun until after this time. All trainees were given LCFLUTTER the week of 7 April to check security violations, knowledgeability of other missions, etc. The results of these tests have already been forwarded to Headquarters.

The men cooperated splendidly during individual briefings but it was difficult to isolate them sufficiently, although we can be reasonably sure no group or singleton knew the documentation or DZ of any other.

The following is a list of the KUBARK installations or installations inhabited by KUBARK personnel which the trainees had knowledge of:

<u>Installation</u>	<u>Who Knew</u>	<u>Extent of Knowledge</u>
1. Training house in Bad Wiessee	all	description, address and telephone number
2. Training house in Siegsdorf, near Traunstein <i>Chiemsee - 7 miles</i>	all	description, location
3. Safehouse in Ambach (<i>aka Steinhilber</i>) where assessed	all except CACCOLAS 27, 28	description, approx. location
4. Para-training hangar in Kaufbeuren	all	description, location
5. Medical office in Nothkaufplatz	all	description, approx. location
6. Medical office on Robert Koch Str.	all except CACCOLAS 10, 28	poor description, doubtful location

Security Information

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KAPOK

7. Packing Room,
McGraw Kaserne description,
location
8. Furstenfeldbruck Air Base all Take-off point for practice
jumps, actual dispatch;
reconnoitered on report-
ing problem
9. Grafenwohr Training Area all Never in any bldgs, but
knew area used as survival
training area by Rangers
10. Room in ONI Bldg, Munich CACCOLAS 27, 28 1 LCFLUTTER test; probably
could not locate or
describe
11. Room in ABC Bldg., all 1 LCFLUTTER test; probably
Belgradstr., Munich could not locate or describe
12. Safe apt in Frankfurt all except Probably could not
used for LCFLUTTER tests CACCOLAS 27, 28 locate or describe
13. Psychological CACCOLAS 26, 28 description, location
Assessment House,
Bad Wiessee
14. Safe Apt., Dachauerstr., CACCOLAS 20, 21, 22, Used for holding during
Munich 24 assessment; description,
address or location
15. Houses in Rottach and All knew of existence and general location.
Bad Wiessee occupied Only CACCOLA 10 had been to ☐ ☐
by ☐ Probably could not provide addresses or
☐ pin point on map.
16. CACCOLA A Training house Only CACCOLA 10 description, location,
in Fussen address

NOTE: CACCOLA 10, having been in the Kaufbeuren hangar in 1952 when they were
a beehive of activity, and again in 1953 when there was nothing left
except para-training facilities, might have been able to deduce the
fact that Kaufbeuren no longer in use as an operational base.

In Athens:

17. Safehouse near Athens Airport CACCOLAS 24, 26 description
18. Safehouse in Kiffissia CACCOLAS 10, 20, 21, 28 description

Security Information

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The following is a list of the KUBARK personnel known to the CACCOLA B trainees:

(a) In constant contact; could furnish good descriptions:

<u>Pseudonym</u>	<u>Known As</u>	<u>Reason for Contact</u>
[]	[]	Project C/O
[]	[]	Project C/O
[]	(the last, possibly)	
[]	[]	Project C/O
[]	[]	COMMO training officer

(b) Met frequently; could probably furnish good descriptions:

[]	[]	assisted in T/C problems; attended social gatherings
[]	[]	Same as above
[]	[]	Same as above
[]	[]	Documents specialist; supervised fill-in, document briefing.
[]	[]	Photography instructor
[]	[]	Para-training
[]	[]	Para-training, packing, field problems
[]	[]	Para-training, packing, field problems
[]	[]	Field problems

(c) Met occasionally; could probably furnish fair to good descriptions:

[]	[]	Inspector General
[]	[]	Asst. Inspector General

Security Information

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~~KAPON~~

Instructor in radar
and airfields

COMMO supervisor

" "

Base Operator

Doctor

First Aid Instructor

Dr's Assistant

LCFLUTTER operator

COMMO supervisor

COMMO supervisor

(d) Met once or twice; probably could not furnish good descriptions:

S/W instructor

In charge of dispatch

Took on tour of airfield

Assisted in T/C problems,
attended social gathering

Assisted in T/C problems;
briefed CACCOLA 27 on
Brest

Assisted in T/C problems

Assisted in field problem

(e) There is also a final category of people, such as the Rangers at Grafenwohr, the Air Force personnel present at dispatch, and the Athens Station personnel whom the trainees saw so briefly that they probably would not even be able to remember them, much less describe them.

Security Information

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10. SCHOOL DISCIPLINE:

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The daily schedule was as follows:

~~KIDON~~
~~NEW ON~~

0630	Reveille
0632/0705	P/T
0705/0730	Wash up, clean room
0730/0800	Breakfast
0800/1200	Classes (usually W/T)
1200/1250	Lunch
1250/1350	Rest Period
1400/1800	Classes (including 1 hr. some type physical exercise)
1800/1850	Supper
1900-1950	Study Period
2000/2230	Free time
2230	Lights Out

Every other week the men received weekend leave in Munich. On the weekends when they had to remain at the school, Saturday was a working day, while Sundays were free.

Discipline at school was quite good, largely because the trainees themselves, with the exception of CACCOLA 21, were a responsible and disciplined group. This was fortunate, as CACCOLA 3's classroom procedure is somewhat lax, and all the instructors were guilty of occasional softness. The problem of combining comradeship with discipline is particularly difficult when instructors and trainees live in such close proximity so long. However, the situation could be considerably improved with stronger and more consistent leadership on the part of the CAPABLE 1 instructors at the school.

11. FINANCES:

The conduct of financial matters was enormously improved by a system of monthly advances and accountings with a punctilious CACCOLA 3 acting as intermediary between CACCOLA 1 personnel and []

The following categorical breakdown of CACCOLA 1 expenses covers the period from 1 Oct. 1952 -- the date at which a new breakdown system was inaugurated -- to 30 April 1953. The overall total covers the period 15 May 1952 to 30 April 1953.

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Salaries	\$10,161.67
Rent, Service, Upkeep, Repair	889.55
Medical	336.05
Expendable Equipment	1,410.80
Food	7,023.83
Travel and Communications	1,760.67
Non-Expendable Equipment	352.49
Operational Entertainment	787.00

Total 1 October ¹⁹⁵² - 30 April ¹⁹⁵³ . . \$22,722.06

Total 15 May ¹⁹⁵² - 30 September ¹⁹⁵² . . 7,832.87

Total \$30,554.93

Communications Equipment Expended	\$11,200.00
Cost of Rubles and Sovereigns	46,632.50

Over-all Total . . \$88,387.43

12. AIS-CAPABLE 1 RELATIONSHIPS:

The harmony in which the cycle was conducted was the result of the continued excellent personal relationships between the American case officers and the CAPABLE 1 instructors and trainees. On no issues did the instructors divide according to party, and among the trainees the Americans seemed to enjoy the same respect and popularity as the CAPABLE 1 instructors.

Feeling that the Americans have been working honestly with them toward common goals to which they are equally as committed, the CACCOLA instructors, trainees and CAPABLE 7 have always welcomed our initiative in all operational matters. Any lessening of initiative and good will on our part would automatically lessen the extent of U.S. control. For this reason as the project grows, new case officers of high calibre will become imperative. Finally by demonstrating initiative and good will in all our joint operations with CAPABLE 1, it seems we are increasing our control over their operations and influencing the growth and direction of the organization as a whole.

- [] [] [] []

46,632.50
44,722.06
7,203.50

Security Information
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Subject
Nr Hrs
Instructor

1. Study of U.S.S.R.

CAGCOLA 3

Part I:

- a. Org. and Structure of ComParty 4
- b. Short History of ComParty (1st
4 chapters)..... 4
- c. Short biography of Stalin and
other Soviet leaders..... 2
- d. RR System of the U.S.S.R..... 8
- e. Other forms of Soviet Transport..... 2
- f. Armed Forces of U.S.S.R..... 8
- g. Soviet Life..... 10
- h. Soviet Postal and Telegraph
System, Communications..... 2
- i. Premises of Rev. Work in Sov. Union... 2
- j. Soviet Youth and possibilities
of carrying on Rev. Work
among it:
Students (univ.)..... 1
High School Students..... 1
Trade School Students..... 1
- k. Organization and Tactics of
Partisan Warfare..... 4
- l. Borders and "Forbidden Zones"..... 6
- m. Cities and Areas particularly
favorable for Rev. Work..... 2
- n. Cities and areas unfavorable for
Rev. Work..... 2
- o. Soviet Literature..... 2
- p. Art, Music, Movies; the Church..... 4
- q. The Soviet Underworld, its Slang..... 4
- r. Medical service in the U.S.S.R.;
Simulation of Diseases 2
- s. Insurance, Social Security,
Savings Accounts, Money Orders, etc.. 1
- t. How to behave in public places
(restaurants, movies, barber
shops, on the streets, etc.)..... 2

98 hrs.

SECRET

Security Information

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Part II:

- a. Ranks and Insignia of MVD and Militia... 2
- b. Org., Structure and Methods of MVD..... 2
- c. Weaknesses of the MVD..... 4
- d. Rules governing civilian and
military registration in U.S.S.R..... 4
- e. Rules governing getting and
leaving a job..... 2
- f. Possibilities for living in the
U.S.S.R. without a job..... 2
- g. Soviet Documentation.....26
- h. Soviet mail correspondence
(international); practice
in writing cover letters, etc..... 3
- i. Exams and Review..... 6

KAPOK

(57) hrs.

Part III:

- a. What to do in the event of war..... 1
- b. Signs of mobilization for war 1
- c. Contacting Relatives..... 1
- d. Mobilization and Demobilization
in the Red Army..... 2
- e. Work of local military organs
(Komandaturas in Occupation
Zones, Voenskomats, etc.)..... 2
- f. The military oath..... 1
- g. Soviet Articles of War, Manual
of Arms, etc..... 8
- h. Organization and functions of
Reserve Regts during the
war (for mil Legends)..... 1
- i. Second World War (for mil legends)... 4

(21) hrs.

Part IV:

Review of Soviet Radio and Press..... (34) hrs.

SOVIETIZATION TOTAL : 210 hrs

Security Information

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2. W/T Training:

CACCOLA 8 & ☐ ☐

a. Introductory Lecture.....	2
b. Printing	3
c. Taking code.....	255
d. Sending.....	87
e. Q-Signals.....	18
f. Cipher Training.....	164
g. Radio Theory.....	85
h. Procedure	39
i. Signal Plan.....	12
j. Equipment.....	18
k. Blind Broadcasts.....	38
l. On-the-Air and Reduced Distance Contacts.....	94
m. Final Instructions.....	4
n. Field Problems.....	20

839 hrs.

3. <u>Ideology</u>	30
4. <u>Conspiratorial Techniques</u> Theory	23
Field Problems.....	30
5. <u>Secret Writing</u>	12
6. <u>Ciphers, Cover Letters</u>	30
7. <u>Falsification of Documents</u>	48
8. <u>Observation and Memory Training</u>	20
9. <u>Reports and Message Writing</u>	52
10. <u>Airfields, Aircraft and Radar</u> Installations	12
11. <u>First Aid</u>	12
12. <u>Propaganda</u>	32
13. <u>Silk Screen Printing Process</u>	24
14. <u>Survival Training, Field Problems</u>	106
15. <u>Para-Training</u>	32
16. <u>Unarmed Combat</u>	26
17. <u>Weapons Familiarization and Firing</u>	12
18. <u>P/T, Volley Ball, etc.</u>	72
<u>Individual Work</u> (no. of hours varied with individual)	573

CAPABLE 14
CAPABLE 14 and ☐
☐
☐
CAPABLE 14
CAPABLE 14
CAPABLE 14
CAPABLE 14 ☐
☐
CAPABLE 14
CAPABLE 42
CACCOLA 3
and CACCOLA 3

1. Military Legends	35
2. Postwar Legends	20
3. Target Areas	15
4. DZ's, Travel Routes.....	20
5. Final Briefing, Special Problems, etc.....	10

All instructors participated

100 hrs.

Total TRG: 210
839
573
100
1722 hrs

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Listed below are the S/W and/or cipher indicators, safety signals, and addresses assigned by CAPABLE 7 to the CACCOLA B trainees prior to dispatch. Traces were run on all addressees.

- A. S/W and/or cipher indicators.
- B. Safety signals.
- C. Addresses.

~~WABOK~~

1. CACCOLA 10:

- A. Date of letter in upper left hand corner.
- B. Letter folded three times (after being folded three times, letter can be folded additionally to fit envelope).
- C. (1) V. LISSNER, Valleggt 9, Oslo, Norway.
(2) Frk. Else JENSEN, Frydendalsvej 27, Copenhagen, Denmark.
(CAPABLE 7 notes CACCOLA 10 could not remember addresses and wrote them down.)

2. CACCOLA 20:

- A. In date month written in letters rather than numerals.
- B. After signature, Postscript.
- C. (1) F. DYNSCHA, Møllergt 42, Third Floor, Oslo, Norway.
(2) Mme. L. CHIPANOKE, 24 Place de Franchises, Liege, Belgium.

3. CACCOLA 21:

- A. Last paragraph ends in question mark.
- B. In date no period after year.
- C. (1) Alex KRAG, Forde, Sunnfjord, Norway.
(2) Victor MESTMACHER, 115 Rue de Laveu, Liege, Belgium.

4. CACCOLA 22:

- A. Letter signed full name.
- B. One or more dates in letter written in numerals rather than letters.
- C. (1) Antoine DECA, 30 Rue de Harlez, Liege, Belgium.
(2) B. JUKOV, Engenegt 96, Drammen, Norway.

5. CACCOLA 24:

- A. In first paragraph phrase in quotation marks.
- B. At end of letter word "pishi" with exclamation point.
- C. (1) P. KASTORNY, Fsb-Alvik, Hardanger, Norway. - 26
(2) Jules BOUSSARD, 11 Rue Adrien de Witte, Liege, Belgium.

6. CACCOLA 26:

- A. In date year written in full (i.e., 1.2.1953).
- B. Comma after salutation.
- C. (1) A. TVERHOUS, Transine BARRIERE, Prov. de Luxembourg, Belgium.
(2) Mme. SPILT, 99 Rue Defacq, St. Gilles, Brussels, Belgium.

7. CACCOLA 27:

- A. Opening salutation must include "milyi".
- B. No period after last sentence letter (before closing words and signature).
- C. (1) A. GHUSHENKO, Venundvik, Gamlehjem per Hansas, Norway
(2) Joseph COUNASSE, 59 Rue de Laveu, Fraipont pres Liege, Belgium.

~~SECRET~~ AENOBLE

SECRET

KARPOK

a. CACCOLA 28:

- A. In date year omitted.
- B. First sentence contains word beginning with "Ok".
- C. (1) Fru. Ester KARLSON (c/o T.T.), Krusesgt 5B, Oslo, Norway.
(2) O. Nikolaky, 24 Bis, Rue Duffaut, Clamart/Seine, France.

Security Information

SECRET